Research
Other on-going research on trade and foreign direct investment
Populist, protectionist, and progressive opposition to globalization is renascent among voters and politicians, but which of these ideologies have successfully inspired interest group mobilization? To answer this question, we collect original data on thousands of groups’ participation in highly organized coalitions opposed to US trade policy and globalization. Examining the types of groups that compose coalitions, variation in activation across issues, and coalitions’ written statements, we find that their motivations are mainly progressive, focused on the environment, human rights, economic justice, and reducing corporate power. We also focus on progressives’ labor union allies, showing that their participation in anti-trade coalitions is driven by both sincere progressive and classic protectionist motives. Thus, a progressive-labor alliance espousing mainly demands for fair trade, not plain protectionism, dominates public activism against US trade agreements. This interest group opposition has no match on the political right, suggesting that the recent efflorescence of populist anti-globalization may not last, even as progressive fair traders use their superior mobilization to endure.
Security Alliances and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions with Barbara Koremenos
In this paper, we argue that security alliances, especially formal defense pacts, are important determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As). We focus on the interests of two relevant actors: the host governments and foreign investors. We posit that host governments are more open to CBM&As with businesses housed in countries with which the host has a security alliance; in these cases, positive security externalities are enhanced while negative security externalities are diminished. Similarly, foreign investors target countries that have security ties with their home countries to rule out future political uncertainties. To test this theory, we develop a directed dyadic dataset of industry-level CBM&A activities of 186 countries from 1997 to 2016. The findings show that the number of M&A deals between a pair of countries are positively and significantly correlated with security treaties and that the effect is stronger under formal defense pacts. Moreover, we find that the effect of security treaties is consistently strong in pairs of OECD countries and mixed country-pairs (composed of an OECD and non-OECD. Finally, the effects of security treaties are more prominent in industries that are considered security-sensitive, like information and computer, high-technology, and transportation. The results highlight the interaction of international political economy and security studies and the importance of not studying one in isolation of the other.
Do governments seek to protect domestic industries from competition by restricting cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As)? International competition increasingly affects domestic markets through inward FDI rather than imports, especially in sectors where goods are relatively hard to trade. I argue that domestic firms and industries will seek insulation, as with international trade, from profit-lowering international competition by securing restrictions on M\&As by foreign firms. Because of limits on overt restrictions of FDI, potential host governments are incentivized to use subtler forms of restrictions. I focus on two main types of regulations that govern M&A activities: competition policies (or antitrust regulations) and national security reviews. I find that both types of regulation discourage M&As that involve foreign global parents more substantially than M&As with domestic global parents. I therefore conclude that governments of developed countries use competition laws and national security regulations to protect domestic firms. This paper explores an under-addressed topic in international political economy and the politics of M\&As, and demonstrates how regulatory standards in this area are politicized to defend narrow economic interests.